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HEALTH CARE POLICY AND LAW

Trends in Use and Expenditures of Brand-name Atorvastatin After Introduction of Generic Atorvastatin
Rising brand-name pharmaceutical expenditures can be significantly mitigated with generic substitution, particularly for high-volume categories, such as statins.
1,2 Pfizer's Lipitor (atorvastatin calcium) was the best-selling drug of all time until a generic version bec ame available in the United States in November 2011.
3 However, national use of Lipitor and the financial impact of generic availability are unknown. Therefore, we analyzed trends in use and expenditures associated with Lipitor after generic atorvastatin availability. (Table) . Lipitor use decreased from 3.9 million adults in 2012 to 0.7 million adults in 2014, with a concomitant increase in uptake of generic statin from 8.6 million in 2012 to 14.3 million in 2014. In this time period, total atorvastatin-associated expenditures decreased from $7.0 billion to $5.4 billion. Total national expenditures associated with Lipitor were $3.5 billion (50% of total atorvastatin cost) in 2012 vs $357 million (7% of total cost) in 2014. Excess expenditure associated with continued Lipitor use totaled $2.1 billion from 2012 to 2014 ( Figure) . More than half (57%) of excessive spending ($1.2 billion) was noted among patients with Medicare or Medicaid, who accounted for 58% of Lipitor users. We found that peruser total expenditure for Lipitor were higher compared with generic throughout 2012 to 2014. However, in 2014, Lipitor peruser OOP cost was lower than generic atorvastatin ($27 vs $49).
Discussion | Availability of generic atorvastatin led to a 28% reduction in atorvastatin-associated expenditures from 2012 to 2014, despite a 20% increase in overall atorvastatin use in the United States. However, persistent prescription of Lipitor resulted in $2.1 billion in excess expenditure from 2012 to 2014.
A report in a privately insured cohort showed that Lipitor prescription resulted in high OOP costs in the 6 months of generic exclusivity given limited competition.
3 Our study adds to this report by providing national estimates of expenditures associated with Lipitor from both private and publically financed insurance programs, showing more than $110 million in excess expenditures on Lipitor beyond the first year of generic introduction. Furthermore, we found that Lipitor OOP cost was lower than that of generic in 2014, likely owing to deals made with pharmacy benefit managers to lower Lipitor copays below that of generics. 
Invited Commentary
Delayed Generic Market Saturation After Patent Expiration-A Billion-Dollar Problem
In this issue of JAMA Internal Medicine, Warraich and colleagues 1 examine excess expenditures associated with use of the proprietary form of atorvastatin (Lipitor) at the national level. Using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) from 2012 to 2014, they report that, in the first year after loss of market exclusivity, the US health care system could have saved approximately $1.9 billion if the estimated 3.9 million users of brand-name Lipitor had used lower-cost generic atorvastatin.
Much has been written about the efforts by brand-name manufacturers to delay generic entry, a business strategy called life-cycle management. These tactics range from preventing generic manufacturers from getting the samples they need to conduct basic studies needed for US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval, to paying generic competitors to stay off the market as part of patent litigation settlements, to "hopping" to new formulations that generic manufacturers must then try to accommodate, such as when omeprazole (Prilosec) users were encouraged to switch to esomeprazole (Nexium) once Prilosec lost market exclusivity.
However, we know much less about what happens after generics are approved. The standard assumption is that competitors flood the market and prices quickly fall. This process is facilitated by state drug product selection laws that permit (or mandate) automatic dispensing of interchangeable generics by pharmacists. So what happened in the Lipitor case?
Warraich and colleagues 1 chart the effect of a set of market preservation strategies-most directed by brand-name manufacturers-that prolong the expected transition to a multisource marketplace. This could be called "delayed generic market saturation." For example, brand-name manufacturers often launch so-called authorized generics, which are brand-name drugs marketed as generics at only a slight discount, to recapture profits that would otherwise have been lost to independent generic competitors. 2 Brand-name manufacturers may also negotiate with insurers to secure a preferred tier on large national formularies for their products even when generics are available, perhaps by leveraging rebates on other products in their portfolios. As a result, patients may have a comparable copayment for brand-name and generic versions, even though the payer covers most of the cost of the prescription. Brand-name manufacturers may also use their substantial marketing resources by advertising against generic substitution 3 (generic manufacturers, as a rule, do not advertise their products) or by distributing coupons to patients to undercut any differences in copayments, leading to a similar outcome as the insurance tiering contracts. In the Lipitor case, Pfizer used some of these strategies to help contribute to $2 billion in excess spending in just the 12 months after the first generic entry. For example, Pfizer sold an authorized generic in partnership with Watson Pharmaceuticals to compete against the independent generic manufacturer Ranbaxy (now Sun Pharmaceuticals).
2 In a study of authorized generic atorvastatin, we found low market uptake for the independent generic during the first 6 months after loss of exclusivity and found no meaningful differences in the per-prescription or monthly out-of-pocket expenditures between the brand-name, authorized generic, and independent generic product. 2 Pfizer also reportedly developed contracts with pharmacy benefits managers to pay additional rebates in exchange for excluding generic atorvastatin during the market transition period. 4 Finally, Pfizer started a copay discount program offering those eligible enrollees a 1-month supply of Lipitor for $4, which would have approximated the patient's out-of-pocket cost for the generic.
4
Policymakers seeking to tackle high drug prices need to address the various practices that brand-name manufacturers use to delay approval of generic drugs, but they also need to create systems to promote rapid market saturation of generics after they reach the market. One factor, accounting for a substantial fraction of the excess costs calculated by Warraich et al 1 in the first year of Lipitor generic availability, dates back to the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984. That statute authorized a special 6-month generic exclusivity incentive intended to encourage independent generic competitors to take on the litigation costs involved in challenging brand-name manufacturers' patents. During that 6-month period, the market duopoly maintains higher-than-expected prices for the generic. However, the market size now commanded by some brand-name products as well as lower-than-expected litigation costs has led to some to recommend scaling back the scope of this incentive. 5 Further research should help address how to make any necessary adjustments in this incentive more than 30 years after its creation, balanced against the economic benefits of rapid generic market saturation. A variety of other policy reforms can improve generic market saturation aside from changes to the 6-month generic exclusivity period. For example, the FDA could ensure that at least 4 generic manufacturers have been preapproved for each product before market exclusivity protections are expected to expire. In markets that fall short of this goal, the FDA could facilitate temporary importation of generic manufacturers already approved by other countries with high-quality regulatory authorities. Coupons already cannot be used by patients who have prescription drug coverage under Medicare, and in 2017, California passed a law banning coupon use if a lower-cost or lower-tiered therapeutically equivalent generic drug is covered by a patient's health plan. A federal statute mirroring California's could seek to extend the restriction on coupons for use in drugs when generic versions are available to all insurers.
The importance of having policies and systems in place that allow rapid uptake of low-cost, FDA-approved generic drugs will be even further magnified when interchangeable versions of biologic medicines (biosimiliars) commonly used to treat rheumatoid arthritis, inflammatory bowel disease, diabetes, and cancer reach the market, because these are some of the highest priced drugs available in the United States. In these cases, delays in market saturation would lead to individual patient and health care system costs well beyond the billions of dollars for Lipitor. In the past almost 35 years since the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic competition has led to remarkable opportunities for high-value care for individual patients and substantial savings for the US health care system as a whole. However, as the Lipitor case indicates, there is still room to improve the efficiency of generic market saturation.
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